Introduction
Prior to sending US troops into Kosovo to protect the civilian population from Serbian aggression, then President Clinton carefully considered the possible consequences of deploying the military in such a volatile region. Would Serbia retaliate against the US-led NATO troops, perhaps precipitating another European war? How many American lives would be lost before the belligerents reached a settlement? Would Serbia eventually concede to US demands or would the US and its allies eventually withdraw without achieving their objectives? The US decision, in other words, was predicated on a careful consideration of the probable duration, the likely outcome, and the expected costs of the engagement. Despite this important and straightforward link between the expected consequences of using force and the decision to use force, it is surprising how very little we know about the consequences of war.
1 If we concede that the expected costs, duration, and outcome of war are an important component of the decision to use force, it is particularly problematic that we have spent so much time studying war onset without first addressing questions related to the duration and outcomes of war.
In this article, we have two purposes. First, we want to improve our understanding of the neglected area of war consequences. Questions related to war duration and war outcome are important in their own right and deserve greater attention. Second, we want to extend our understanding of war onset by explicitly incorporating a richer and more detailed assessment of the probable consequences of war. We do so by developing a model of war that incorporates the decision to begin a war as well as the decision to end it.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we informally present and then critique the common model of war that depicts war as a costly lottery between decisively winning and decisively losing the war. We argue that this "Fight to the Finish" model not only provides a poor foundation upon which to understand the onset of war, but it also fails to provide a useful point of departure to address the great variety of types of war observed empirically. Second, we present a model of war that allows the disputants to negotiate even after the war has begun and thus allows for much greater variation in how and when wars end. Third, we present the results of the model. The model not only identifies the conditions that increase the likelihood of war onset but those that impact the likely duration and outcome of war as well. Finally, we present the results of a simulation that help to clarify some of the comparative static results.
While the individual results of the model are important, we maintain that the model makes a broader contribution to our understanding of international conflict. First, the model represents a unified theory of war onset and war termination. We agree strongly with Blainey (1988) and Wagner (2000) that the onset and termination of war are linked. To understand either, we must understand both. By modeling not only the start of war but its termination as well, we take an important step towards a holistic theory of war. Second, the model challenges the common depiction of war as an alternative to politics. We maintain that war is an extension of politics (Clausewitz 1976) ; politicians use force not to supplant their diplomatic efforts but to support them. By incorporating negotiation opportunities as well as battles into the model, we allow diplomacy to continue throughout the war.
The fight to the finish model not only limits our ability to understand the consequences of war, but it may also impede our analysis of war onset. As Wagner (2000) explains, if war ends only when one side is vanquished, then war is an extremely costly gamble. Even in the best-case scenario where the leader ultimately wins, she must pay the significant cost of destroying her enemy. The expectation of such costs likely creates an artificially high barrier to the use of force. If the war can end short of such devastation, then the costs of using force would be much lower. Expectations about the duration of the conflict would drive expectations about the costs of force. If the conflict was expected to be short, perhaps so short that it would likely end even before a "war" as war is commonly understood developed, then the expected costs of using force would presumably be much lower as well. If true, then leaders may be much more willing to resort to force than typically envisioned because the barriers to using force are not as high as often presumed. Failure to consider how expectations about the costs of using force vary thus may compromise our understanding about when leaders are likely to resort to force.
In order to provide a better foundation to answer questions related to both war outcomes and war onset, it is necessary to develop a model of war that allows the disputants not only to negotiate a settlement to avoid a war, but to negotiate a settlement to terminate the war as well.
To this end, we develop a richer, although admittedly still simplistic, model of war that includes the important possibility that the politicians can end the dispute by negotiating a settlement. In the "bargaining and war" model developed below, the onset of war no longer signals the end of diplomacy but a continuation of it (Clausewitz 1976 ).
The Bargaining and War Model
The "fight to the finish" model is commonly adopted because of its simplicity. War is an extremely complicated process and some simplifying assumptions are obviously necessary. We maintain, however, that a model of war at a minimum must incorporate not only military maneuverings but political machinations as well. We thus include in this model the possibility for the disputants to negotiate a settlement both before and after fighting has begun.
Incorporating the possibility of diplomacy in war, however, raises a fundamental puzzle. If the belligerents need not secure a decisive military victory to end the war but can instead terminate the war by negotiating a settlement, why would they be able to reach such an agreement after the fighting has begun if they were unable to do so at an earlier time so as to prevent the conflict in the first place (Fearon 1995 , Wagner 2000 ? To address this puzzle, we include uncertainty in the model (Fearon 1995) . While negotiations may initially fail because the disputants cannot agree on the terms of settlement, they may eventually succeed as the disputants learn about what concessions each side is willing to make.
Although we believe that the possibility of continued diplomacy is fundamental to a model of war, it is also critical to recognize that these negotiations take place against the backdrop of military engagement. We include the military component of the war in the model in two important ways. First, the fighting ensures that failing to reach an agreement is costly. The more time it takes to reach a settlement, the more resources are expended in the war effort.
benefits see Filson and Werner 2000) . In addition to his/her benefits, each player also has some 
These assumptions imply that each player always wants more resources and more benefits, that the marginal utilities of resources and benefits are diminishing, and that the marginal utility of benefits is increasing in resources and the marginal utility of resources is increasing in benefits.
This last condition implies that a disputant's willingness to risk resources in battle is increasing in his amount of resources and decreasing in the size of his benefits. R represents A's resources after she wins the first battle and loses the second. The model imposes no a priori restrictions on the resource losses that occur during fighting other than that a loss is worse than a win. The resources that remain after a series of battles can depend on the initial resources, the order of wins and losses, or anything else that may be relevant. Since empirically resource losses differ across battles and wars, this generality is useful for constructing falsifiable hypotheses about the onset, duration, and outcomes of war.
While the disputants value resources directly, they are also important because they enable them to continue fighting. We incorporate the possibility of a decisive military victory into the game by assuming that the disputants must maintain some minimal amount of resources to continue fighting. The war ends as soon as one side's resources fall below the minimal amount of resources necessary to continue fighting. If both sides' resources are below the minimal amount then the status quo is restored. The bargaining and war game thus may be long, but it cannot be infinite. We assume that if one side is decisively defeated, she relinquishes all claims to her benefits. The disputants' initial resources and the amounts of resources lost with each battle determine the maximum possible duration of the war.
Although in real wars the disputants may be uncertain about of variety of factors, we introduce uncertainty into the model in a simple way in order to obtain precise results. First, we assume that the uncertainty is one-sided; D has complete information about A, but A does not have complete information about D. Although it is surely heroic to assume that D is completely informed about A, a large variety of equilibria exist in bargaining games with two-sided incomplete information, making prediction difficult or impossible.
3 In contrast, the bargaining game we describe has a unique equilibrium. 
Results
In the following subsections, we present several results from the bargaining and war game. 4 The equilibrium concept is a refined version of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).
The PBE requires that both types of D play optimally, that A's beliefs are determined using Baye's rule whenever possible, and that A's choices are optimal given her beliefs. 5 We refine the PBE equilibrium in order to eliminate unrealistic off-the-path beliefs (see Fudenberg and Tirole 1992, Mas-Colell et al. 1995 
War Onset
We begin by identifying the conditions necessary for a war to begin. In the model, three things must happen for war to begin: A must make a proposal, D must reject it, and A must attack 
, where γ , it must also be true that r q ≤ . Since strong defenders are always at least as likely as weak defenders to refuse a settlement, then the weakest defenders tend to be "screened out" as they accept negotiated settlements. This leaves only the stronger defenders as fighting continues.
7
If A is willing to attack even when she is certain that the defender is the strong type chances but not so much that she is unwilling to follow through on her threat to attack. This implies that since A must maintain a credible threat to attack for a war to start, one of two things is likely true when wars begin: either the attacker is willing to fight even in the worst case scenario that the defender is very strong or the attacker is initially so confident that the defender is weak that some bad news is not sufficient to dissuade her from attacking.
The second implication follows from Result 2. Result 2 shows that for A to be willing to fight the first battle, she must also be willing to fight the last battle as well. If A anticipates that she will eventually retreat, the game unravels. A anticipates that if she fights in the first stage then the negotiations that follow will fail and she will be forced to retreat. Rather than pay the costs of fighting in the first stage simply to retreat when negotiations inevitably fail, she retreats immediately. A's unwillingness to fight to the end prevents her from credibly threatening to attack initially.
In more complex examples in which A might sustain several losses before conceding her benefits, A need not be willing to fight every battle in order to credibly threaten to attack initially, but she does need to be willing to fight to the end at least when the tide of battle is in her favor. Just as D's response to her demands provides A with information so too do battle outcomes. 9 According to Baye's rule, A updates her beliefs that 
, where
where 3 λ is defined above. Substitute for 3 λ and simplify to show that (Powell 1999 This result addresses two long-standing debates in the discipline regarding the relationships between the possibility of conflict and the distribution of power and the possibility of conflict and the value of the status quo (see Powell 1999 and Werner 1999 for reviews). If a discrepancy between the distributions of power and benefits creates a permissive condition for conflict, then the relationships between the probability of conflict, the distribution of power, and the value of the status quo are interconnected. A state may be willing to attack even if her probability of success is low if her share of the available benefits is even lower. This may explain why some small states are sometimes willing to take on much larger adversaries. The degree to which there is a discrepancy between the distribution of power and the distribution of benefits also provides a useful way to define the elusive notion of state dissatisfaction (see also Powell 1999) . While dissatisfaction with the status quo has long been identified as a critical component of war, it has been difficult to determine either analytically or empirically which states are dissatisfied.
Result 4 identifies how different parameters affect whether or not A is willing to attack and thus affect the possibility of war. 
In stage 2: h d accepts A's proposal after A wins the first battle if:
where 2 p denotes the probability A attacks and
where p denotes the probability A attacks and 
which, when combined with the fact that
. Therefore, it cannot be the case that A prefers to propose some option depends upon how A assesses the value of the gamble. The more confident A is that the defender is the weak type, the less risky it seems to make a tough demand. A less optimistic attacker is more cautious and is thus more likely to make moderate demands in order to reduce the possibility of war against the stronger defender. It is thus not surprising that many have noted that when wars do start, the attacker often seems very confident of victory (Blainey 1988 losses make her less optimistic, we should expect that she is more likely to offer an acceptable settlement after a loss than after a victory. Thus, wars in which the attacker is losing should tend to be shorter than if she is winning.
We also expect that early losses for the attacker are particularly conducive to a short war.
Compare two wars where both are at the same stage t. Suppose that prior to t each war has the same number of wins and losses for A, but that in war 1 the losses occurred early on and in war 2 the wins occurred early on. If the lowest type of defender still active in each war is the same , and assuming that the equilibrium involves only pure strategies, then by Baye's rule A's beliefs at stage t are the same in each war and the continuations are identical. However, it is likely that the lowest type still active in war 1 is a stronger type, because early losses make A pessimistic, and this makes A more likely to make less demanding proposals -thus, more types of defenders accept proposals early on. This contributes to A's pessimism further, because if the lowest type still active at stage t in war 1 is a stronger type then A must be more pessimistic at stage t in war 1, and as a result is more likely to make a proposal that will be accepted by the strong types.
Thus, war is likely to end sooner when A sustains early losses. The gamble of making the tough demand also seems less risky the lower the anticipated costs of fighting. Unless A risks running out of resources, A knows that she can modify her demands when the fighting stops and the disputants return to the negotiation table. The costs of fighting are thus the penalty she must pay for attempting to get the better deal initially. The higher the penalty, the less likely A will want to pay it. The potential reward of gambling with the tougher demand also impacts A's willingness to take the gamble. The more concessions the weak defender is willing to make, the better the return if the gamble actually pays off. Anticipating a large reward if the gamble pays off, A is willing to accept the risk of war.
The Terms of Settlement
If and when negotiations do succeed, what are the terms of settlement? To some degree, the outcome of a war is unpredictable. The war began because A did not know for certain which defender she faced and thus which terms were acceptable. In addition what D is willing to accept depends in part on the history of the war and we cannot anticipate battle outcomes with certainty.
We can, however, identify the parameters that impact what both types of D are willing to accept and thus generally determine how the terms of settlement might vary between conflicts. Result 7 establishes that D is willing to concede more of the benefits during the negotiations than he expects he will have to concede in battle. Result 8 identifies the parameters that affect the size of the concession D is willing to make (in stages 1 and 2) or accept (in stage 3). 
Proof: Consider the negotiating position of type h d in stage 3. First note that if . Given this, her expected amount of benefits is R , this implies that
Note that if type
. Because the right-hand side of this inequality is equal to ) ) 1 ( , (
A similar argument establishes that
is the same. For brevity we omit the details. A similar logic applies to stages 1 and 2 and is omitted for the sake of brevity. QED 
w ∆ , and l ∆ may be inframarginal and have no effect on 
Simulation Results
The above discussion describes the model's comparative statics for a relatively simple case. In this section, we explore the model further using simulation methods. with no war and the preservation of the status quo, war with several battles, an instant settlement, a battle followed by a settlement, or a battle followed by a retreat and a return to the status quo.
In all of the results presented here the following utility functions are used: accepts. In this instance, the war endures when A severely miscalculates her opponent. The war can last because A was initially confident that she was facing a weak defender but was in fact confronting a much stronger defender. While A learns from D's refusal and from her battle losses, her initial optimism ensures that the learning process is slower than if she was not so confident originally.
These last cases demonstrate that a perceived imbalance of power when the benefits are balanced leads to re-distribution. A always makes a demand in this instance. Whether or not a war follows and how long the war lasts depends on much the defender believes she must concede, if anything. The stronger the defender actually is, the more likely a war will start and the less likely the war will end quickly. Together these cases provide important evidence that a perceived disparity between the distributions of power and benefits coupled with some uncertainty about how large that disparity might be is a potent source of conflict.
Conclusion
This model, although already fairly complex, should be viewed as only a starting point to understand the process of war onset and war termination. There are many factors that likely impact how the disputants' negotiate and fight that are not included in this model. Most notably, the model is devoid of any domestic political considerations. In this model, we assume that the attacker can effortlessly revise upward or downward her demands. Similarly we assume that the benefits at stake are completely divisible. A leader responsive to domestic political concerns, however, is likely much less flexible. We also make fairly simple assumptions about each side's probability of victory in battle. In reality, the disputants' probability of success is likely affected by what happens on the battlefield and by what military strategies they choose. Further, we have not included in this model the potential for third parties to intervene. The anticipation of thirdparty intervention not only influences the disputants' strategies but also impacts their probability of success in the case of intervention. We do not deny the importance of these areas and intend to include such considerations into the model in the near future. We offer this model as a base case from which we can measure the impact of these other factors.
Despite its simplicity, we contend that this model makes an important contribution to our understanding of international conflict because it provides a unified theory of war onset and war termination. The equilibrium specify not only if a war starts, but when it ends, and the terms on which it terminates. Since the duration and the terms of the war depend on which defender the attacker actually faces (and that fact is unknown) and on the battle history, the duration of the war and the terms of settlement are to some degree unpredictable. We have provided, however, several results that increase our ability to anticipate the onset, termination, and outcome of international conflict.
The model also provides a general explanation for why wars start and how they end. In the model a war starts because 1. The attacker believes her power affords her a greater share of the benefits than she currently has and thus demands some concessions from the defender and 2.
The defender believes that she does not need to make as many concessions as the attacker has demanded and thus refuses to concede. The war continues so long as the attacker continues to overestimate what the defender will concede or, in the event of a retreat, to underestimate what she must give up. The war ends when the attacker's and the defender's beliefs about the defender's power converge sufficiently for the attacker to make a proposal acceptable to the defender.
The model suggests that the war itself is the mechanism by which this convergence occurs. Ironically, war lays the path to peace (Wagner 1993) . If the disputants initially are uncertain about each other's abilities, then the opponent's continued willingness to fight as well as the progress on the battlefield provides considerable information about such questions. As the belligerents learn about each other through the war, negotiations become more productive as each recognizes the demands they can make or must concede to. In this depiction of war, the military is no longer an alternative to diplomacy, but instead an extension of it; the disputants fight in order to support rather than to supplant their negotiating position. 
